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Introduction
The environmental impact caused by agricultural prac-
tices is generating increasing interest and concern in so-
ciety. The process of intensification of agricultural pro-
duction initiated decades ago has meant, in addition to
a spectacular increase in agricultural productivity, higher
environmental impacts brought about by agricultural
practices. This intensification has provoked environ-
mental problems such as aquifer pollution, bioaccumu-
lation of toxic residues of agro-chemicals on living
tissues and the loss of biodiversity, to name but a few.
In this context, organic farming appears as a produc-
tion system whose objective is to create integrated and
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Organic farming integrates environmental concerns and criteria within farm management practices in order to reduce
the environmental impact of agricultural production. In this paper, the shadow price of two of the main indicators of
pollution arising from agricultural practices, nitrogen surplus and impact of pesticides, are calculated and compared
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their levels of pollution emission than for conventional farms. This may be due to the fact that the specific regulations
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Resumen
Precios sombra de la contaminación en la agricultura orgánica y convencional: una aplicación 
en la agricultura mediterránea
La agricultura ecológica integra criterios ambientales en las prácticas de producción agrícola con el objeto de me-
jorar el impacto de la producción agraria sobre el medio ambiente. En este trabajo se estiman y comparan los precios
sombra de dos de los contaminantes más importantes en la producción agraria, el excedente de nitrógeno y la conta-
minación por pesticidas, en el contexto de la agricultura mediterránea. Los resultados muestran que el coste margi-
nal de reducción de la contaminación es más alto para las explotaciones ecológicas que para las convencionales. Ello
estaría indicando que la regulación de agricultura ecológica es de hecho más restrictiva ambientalmente que la de la
agricultura convencional. En este sentido los resultados sugieren que la agricultura ecológica podría ser una respues-
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sustainable systems from an environmental, economic
and social perspective (Lampkin, 1994). The minimi-
sation of the dependence on external inputs is sought,
trying at the same time to maximise the resources
available in the farm, in the form of closed cycles. With
this aim, environmental considerations are integrated
within farm management practices in order to preserve
soil fertility and its biological activity in the long term,
trying to avoid, as far as possible, all environmental
impacts arising from the agricultural activity, which
may imply, in turn, a sacrifice in output or revenues.
A key point for the implementation of an environ-
mental-technical regulation in a productive sector is
the determination of firms’ economic costs implied by
the compliance. It may be expected that, the more res-
trictive the regulation, the higher the economic sacri-
fice firms need to make for that compliance. In this
sense, the computation of shadow prices may provide
some information about the environmental impacts and
the costs of an environmentally friendly production
from the field of production economics. Shadow prices
measure the marginal sacrif ice needed, in terms of
revenues or production, to comply with some environ-
mental restriction on a given pollutant, for instance, or
the marginal cost of pollution abatement. This informa-
tion also allows us to compare the impact on diverse
productive sectors of different regulatory frameworks.
This way, it would seem reasonable to expect higher
marginal costs of pollution abatement, or shadow prices,
in those scenarios with higher environmental restric-
tions, that is, higher pollution shadow prices in organic
than in conventional farming, given the larger degree
of environmental restrictions of organic compared to
conventional farming. This is precisely the context in
which this research is placed.
The comparison of pollution shadow prices in con-
ventional and organic farming, in addition, may allow
us to analyse the role played by farms engaged in orga-
nic farming programmes towards a better environ-
mental quality.
Comparing conventional and organic farming, though,
is not a straightforward task, as there are a number of
difficulties associated. The first problem arises from
the very concept of organic farming and its holistic
approach that, unlike conventional farming, places
emphasis on considering the farm as a system where
all the elements interact with each other. This fact
makes it diff icult to establish comparisons, because
«we are dealing with different systems, not modifications
to individual practices» (Lampkin, 1994, p. 31). Accor-
ding to this author, the widespread practice of compa-
ring both methods of production, conventional and
organic, based only on some selected variables would
be inadequate because it would neglect this considera-
tion of organic systems as a whole. This view is also
shared by Roberts and Swinton (1996), who consider
that the validity of the comparisons relies upon the clo-
seness of technologies. Another problem pointed out by
Cacek and Langner (1986) and by Roberts and Swinton
(1996) is the fact that organic farming is characterised
by a high diversity of crops, as opposed to conventional
farming, that tends to crop specialisation.
In addition to the above, a fundamental limitation
encountered when organic and conventional farming
systems are compared, although not exclusive of this
kind of analysis, is the lack of consideration of the envi-
ronmental impacts of each system, the environmental
external costs. That is, economic comparisons are
carried out, but the distinct effects on the environment
of each system of production are not taken into account.
Faeth et al. (1991) indicate, as cited in Lee (1992, p. 83):
«... this failure to account explicitly for environmental
damages when analysing low-input systems has seriously
distorted the economic comparisons of low-input and
conventional agricultural production systems.»
This idea is also mentioned by Roberts and Swinton
(1996, p. 10) in the following terms: «Typically these
systems are neither more profitable nor higher yielding
than the systems they replace. However, they often
result in less contamination of ground and sur-
face waters, less pesticide residue on the marketed
product, or better soil quality. Having been designed
to attain these environmental objectives, these systems
cannot be evaluated fairly on productivity criteria
alone.»
Taking the above into account, it has to be pointed
out that, so far, the majority of contributions to the lite-
rature on this «comparative» approach have been
carried out from a rather partial approach. In other
words, these works do not integrate those features cha-
racterising conventional and organic farming systems
globally, but rather select only a given field from which
comparisons are made.
With this respect, most studies comparing conven-
tional and organic farming focus on two aspects: envi-
ronmental impact and economic performance, both
studied from several points of view. Thus, the diffe-
rences in the environmental impacts arising from both
systems are analysed (Stolze et al., 2000), as well as
differences in yields (Offerman and Nieberg, 2000;
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Lotter, 2003), costs, prof its and price differentials
(Offerman and Nieberg, 2000).
Likewise, in the field of production economics this
kind of analysis has been traditionally carried out from
this somewhat incomplete point of view, that is,
without considering these features that characterise
organic farming, undoubtedly influencing its perfor-
mance. This fact is specif ically acknowledged by
Oude-Lansink et al. (2002) and Sipiläinen and Oude-
Lansink (2005), who recognise that no consideration
of the environmental impacts of any kind has been
taken into account when carrying out their respective
studies on the efficiency of conventional and organic
farming systems.
In this matter, this work tries to overcome these limi-
tations and integrates economic, as well as environ-
mental variables in the analysis. The objective of the
present paper is the computation of the shadow price
of pollution arising both from conventional and organic
farming. This is done, not only to find out the marginal
cost of pollution abatement in each production system,
but also to be able to compare these shadow prices in
order to analyse to what extent the regulation of organic
farming contributes towards an improvement in envi-
ronmental quality. In this sense, the computation of the
shadow price of two of the main indicators of contami-
nation arising from agricultural practices, namely, ni-
trogen excess and pesticide impact, may serve as a
guide for prioritization of agrienvironmental subsidies,
for example, organic over conventional farming, or
otherwise. In addition, this information may also ad-
vise authorities in the process of adjustment of the
regulations, with specific reference to fertilization and
pesticide management practices, in this particular case.
To the best of our knowledge, this work provides the
f irst attempt to apply this particular framework in 
a Mediterranean context. So far, other comparisons
have been made between conventional and organic
farming and Mediterranean cultures, such as Greek
olive-growing (Tzouvelekas et al., 2001a) and cotton
farms (Tzouvelekas et al., 2001b). These works, though,
do not calculate pollution shadow prices and are res-
tricted to the computation of efficiency indexes with
no consideration of environmental impacts, as in the
aforementioned works by Oude-Lansink et al. (2002)
and Sipiläinen and Oude-Lansink (2005). On the other
hand, the only available piece of research facing speci-
fically this issue (Zhengfei et al., 2005), is an appli-
cation to the eff iciency of Dutch agriculture hardly
comparable to the Mediterranean context.
With this objective, a non-parametric analysis is
carried out, based on the concept of directional output
distance function. Shadow prices are calculated as the
ratios of the dual variables associated with each res-
triction in the linear program, following Ball et al.
(1994) and Oude-Lansink and Silva (2004), among
others. As described above, attention is focused on two
particular indicators of pollution arising from agricul-
ture such as nitrogen excess and the impact of pesti-
cides.
Methodology
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) model 
for the computation of shadow prices
The fact that the production of goods and services
has negative effects on the environment has been re-
flected in production economics by the hypothesis of
weak disposability (Shephard, 1970). It is considered
that production process has outputs of two types: one,
desirable, goods and services, and another one, undesi-
rable, pollution or the negative effect on the environ-
ment brought about by the process. Desirable output
is a good viewed as strongly disposable, in other words,
a decrease in its amount has no cost. On the other hand,
the reduction in pollution levels has a cost, that is, it
is weakly disposable.
In this work, we try to examine, precisely, what is
the marginal cost of the reduction of pesticide and
fertiliser pollution in conventional and organic farming.
In other words, how much desirable output has to be
given up by efficient farms in each sector in order to
reduce pollution at the margin.
With this objective, the directional distance function
will be used, which is def ined next. Let us consi-
der an input vector , a desirable
output vector and an undesirable
output vector . Production techno-
logy may be represented by an output correspondence
, where P(x) is the output set that can
be obtained from a given input vector. This corres-
podence satisf ies certain axioms (Shephard, 1970). 
For the case that y is disposable and b is not, it holds
that if ( y, b)∈ P(x), (θ y,θ b)∈ P(x) ∀0 ≤θ ≤1.
x → P x( ) ⊂ ℜ++m,r
b = b
1
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Production set may also be def ined by the direc-
tional distance function, which is defined as:
[1]
where (gy, gb) is the directional vector. This function
indicates the maximum expansion and contraction in
good and bad output, respectively, which is feasible
given technology P(x).
Following Ball et al. (1994) and according to the
duality between the directional distance function and
the revenue function (Färe et al., 2004a), the following
equivalence may be expressed, by which the shadow
price of the undesirable outputs is computed
[2]
where and are
the dual variables associated with each restriction in
the following linear program (3) (Ball et al., 1994; Lee
et al., 2002; Shaik et al., 2002; Oude-Lansink and Silva,
2004). These dual variables give a measure of the effect
on the distance (or the efficiency) of a change on these
constraints1.
As commented earlier, DEA methodology2 will be
used in the computation of pollution shadow prices. In
this particular empirical application, these dual varia-
bles are obtained from the computation of the follow-
ing linear program (primal and dual formulations are
specified in the Appendix):
where there is a sample of k = 1,…, K farms, m = 1,…, M
desirable outputs, n = 1,…, N inputs and r = 1,…, R
undesirable outputs; λk are the intensity variables or
weights and (yk, – bk) is the directional vector.
Two essential methodological aspects in the com-
putation of shadow prices with the directional distance
function are: how to specify the weak disposability res-
triction for the undesirable outputs and which directio-
nal vector to choose. As shown in the linear program
[3] above, in this particular case undesirable outputs
have the same restriction as inputs (Hailu and Veeman,
2001) and the directional vector used is (yk, – bk). Next,
we will comment on these two decisions.
Regarding the definition of the production set and
the frontier of efficiency, an important debate exists
on how to specify the weak disposability axiom by
Shepard (1970) in the definition of the output set and
the distance function in DEA. This debate is of parti-
cular relevance when we have real production sets with
«super-polluting» units. We call «super-polluting» units
those units that, for a given input level, have more pollu-
tion emissions than the most polluting efficient unit.
In Figure 1 the production set is depicted with a
good output, y, and a bad output, b; for a given input
level x, a, b and c are extreme units of the actual pro-
duction set, b is the eff icient unit with the highest
emission level, c is an extreme «super-polluting» unit
and unit i represents a non extreme «super-polluting»
unit. Oabcd represents the envelope of the production
set for a convex technology when an equality restric-
tion for undesirable outputs (Färe et al., 1989) is used
in DEA3. A projection of unit i towards the envelope
[3]
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1 For a more detailed explanation on the basis of this approach, see Shephard (1970, Section 11.4).
2 The software package used is GAMS 21.7 (General Modeling Algebraic System).
3 This is a way of specifying the weak disposability axiom of Shephard (1970) in DEA. It means that if (y,b) ∈ P(x), (y’,b) ∈ P(x)
∀y’≤ y.
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of the production set, using the directional distance in-
dicated by the vector in the diagram, would place that
unit on section b-c of the envelope. The slope of b-c
determines the computed shadow price of pollution for
unit i. On that section, substitution relationship bet-
ween good and bad output is negative which, would
give us the (positive) shadow value of pollution for that
unit. In other words, pollution reduction would imply
an increase in desirable output.
If it is considered that the shadow value of pollution
indicates the marginal social cost of its reduction, mea-
sured in terms of good output, the result above would
be an absurd. This would indicate that there are effi-
cient f irms that may reduce pollution by increasing
production. The problem is that the «super-polluting»
units on the envelopment of the production set to the
right of unit b are not efficient.
The shadow value of pollution that will be used in
this research tries to express the social cost of pollution
reduction as the opportunity cost of its reduction in
terms of good output for the efficient units. We are not
concerned by the social costs brought about by ineffi-
ciency. The problem is that, depending on how the
weak disposability restriction is specified in DEA or
on which directional vector is chosen, it may happen
that those «super-polluting» units on the envelope of
the production set are classified as efficient for purposes
of shadow price computation.
In the literature, several methodologies have been
suggested in order to correct for this problem. For ins-
tance, Picazo-Tadeo and Prior (2009) propose a two stage
process in the context of efficiency measures. Färe et
al. (2006) give a specific definition of directional weak
disposability which, in the last instance, means treating
the bad output as an input. Without getting into deeper
arguments on this debate, the use of a ≤ restriction4 for
undesirable outputs in the specification of the distance
function allows attributing null value to the shadow
price of those super-polluting units that, after having
good and bad output increased and decreased, respec-
tively, according to the distance function used in this
work could subsequently increase efficiency by redu-
cing pollution. This implies a change in the envelope,
that now would be segment nabh, and the projection
of unit i towards segment b-h of the new envelope. We
have adopted this approach.
This choice of the directional vector is of particular
importance in the current context of any environmental
policy. It is usually considered to be up to the resear-
cher and it depends on the objective of the specif ic
application put in place. However, in a context where
undesirable outputs or by-products are to be taken into
account, the directional vector more commonly used
is the own observation, (gy, gb) = (y, – b), that measures
the maximum equiproportionate increase and decrease
in goods and bads, respectively. Besides, the choice of
the own observation makes the determination of the
directional vector straightforward. This is the vector
used in this empirical application.
Another vector used in the literature, although to a
much lesser extent, is the vector (gy, gb) = (1, – 1), that
assigns the same value to each unit of expansion and
contraction of the desirable and undesirable outputs
respectively (Färe et al., 2005; Huhtala and Marklund,
2005). This vector may be useful for comparative pur-
poses among firms (Chung, 1996) and because, assu-
ming allocative efficiency and a common directional
vector for all firms, the sum of firms’efficiencies corres-
ponds to the efficiency of the industry. Additionally,
it is consistent with a requirement for reduction in
undesirable outputs (Färe et al., 2005). Nevertheless,
the choice of a fixed vector that equally credits increa-
ses in good outputs and reductions in bad outputs
should be further justif ied (Chung, 1996). The last
option5 cited in the literature is the use of the price
vector as directional vector (Chung, 1996). This option,
however, would require the derivation of the shadow
prices of the bads, given that their prices are not nor-
mally observable.
Data collection and variables
The dataset used for the present empirical applica-
tion corresponds to a sample of 86 farms from the
region of Navarre (Northern Spain), for the year 2001.
This sample is further divided into two sub-samples.
The first sub-sample corresponds to 54 conventional
farms, whose data (FADN) were provided by the Tech-
nical Secretary of the Department of Rural Develop-
ment and Environment of Navarre. According to the
European classification by types of farming (Commission
4 It means that if (y,b) ∈ P(x), (y’,b’) ∈ P(x) ∀y’≤ y, b’≥ b.
5 Lee et al. (2002) calculate the directional vector by utilizing the annual abatement schedules of pollutants and the production
plans of good output as proxy variables for bads and goods, respectively.
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Decision 85/377/EEC), these farms may be classified
either as Type 311, Specialist quality wine, or as Type
603, Field crops and vineyards combined.
The second sub-sample consists of 32 organic farms
certified by the Council of Organic Agricultural Pro-
duction of Navarre (CPAEN/NNPEK, Consejo de la
Producción Agraria Ecológica de Navarra/Nafarroako
Nekazal Produkzio Ekologikoaren Kontseilua), which
fall also under the two previous farming types, that is,
Type 311 and Type 603. Specifically, 72% of farms in
the organic sample obtain more that 50% of their
revenue from organic farming and 50% of the sample
obtain 100% of their revenues from organic farming,
in other words, they are pure organic farms.
Four inputs (land, labour, capital and fertilisers and
pesticides), one desirable output (total revenues) and
two undesirable outputs (nitrogen excess and impact
of pesticide use) are considered in the study. Specifi-
cally, land is measured in hectares of utilised agricul-
tural area (UAA); total labour is measured in annual
work units (AWU); capital is measured in euros, corres-
ponding to depreciation and hire of machinery and
buildings; and the total amount of fertilisers and pes-
ticides employed in the farm, in euros, that account for
expenses in fertilisers and pesticides. A unique, aggre-
gated6 output has been considered in the analysis
because, in spite of the fact that vineyard cultivation
is farms’ main orientation, the great majority are multi-
product farms, and culture compositions vary from
farm to farm. This approximates the impact of endoge-
nous quality7, in the form of the organic label. Certain
characteristics exist that differentiate both categories
of products and these characteristics are reflected in
the price paid for organic produce, higher than conven-
tional price. Accordingly, the desirable or good output
variable to be used, is total revenues in euros (Tzouvelekas
et al., 2001a,b; Huhtala and Marklund, 2005; Larsen
and Foster, 2005; Madau, 2005; Zhengfei et al., 2005).
The differences in quality between conventional and
organic products, as represented by the higher price
paid for organic products are, therefore, introduced in
the output variable.
Regarding the undesirable outputs, nitrogen excess
(kg) is calculated following the method of soil surface
nitrogen balance by the OECD (2001). This method
calculates the difference, based on the nitrogen cycle,
between the nitrogen inputs entering the soil and the
nitrogen outputs leaving the soil. Data on fertilisation
strategies, such as products and quantities used, as well
as on harvested crops, were gathered during the inter-
view with organic farmers in order to allow for the
calculation of the balance of nitrogen. In the case of
conventional farmers, the available data are monetary
expenses in fertilisers only. In order to determine the
quantities of nitrogen applied, a fertiliser price index
was elaborated, weighting according to fertilisation
strategies8. Finally, OECD coefficients for nitrogen
extraction by crops, biological nitrogen fixation and
atmospheric deposition were used.
The undesirable output that accounts for the envi-
ronmental impact of pesticides was calculated follo-
wing the method by Kovach et al. (1992). This method
is used to calculate the impact on the environment of
the pesticides most commonly used in the treatment of
fruits and vegetables. The value obtained, the environ-
mental impact quotient (EIQ), may be used to compare
the environmental impact of different management
techniques or strategies. As in the case of nitrogen balan-
ce, data on pesticide management strategies, such as pro-
ducts used and quantities applied, were obtained from
the interview with organic farmers. The data of conven-
tional farms were obtained using the amount of pesti-
cide purchase and a price index, applying the methodo-
logy explained above to the case of pesticides.
Results
Description of the sample
Summary statistics of the data are presented in Table 1.
As can be observed, there are no great differences bet-
ween the size and structure of the two subsamples,
conventional and organic.
6 As acknowledged by Tauer (2001), Färe et al. (2004b) and Barnum and Gleason (2006), among others, aggregating outputs (and
inputs) means that technical efficiency measures are biased due to allocative inefficiency. The dimension of this bias will probably
vary among firms, which implies that the rankings of firms may also vary at diverse aggregation levels (Färe et al., 2004b).
7 The organic label provides a differentiation of endogenous quality in which the price realised may be viewed as function of the
characteristics of the product, which result from a number of management practices, voluntarily adopted by the producers
(Kristofersson and Rickertsen, 2004). Exogenous quality, on the other hand, is determined by other factors that are beyond producer’s
control, such as origin or location (Daraio and Simar, 2005).
8 These fertilisation strategies are proposed for the different locations in the sample by technicians of the ITG-Agrícola (Technical
Institute of Agricultural Management).
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Tables 2 and 3 show the ratios of inputs and the
amount of nitrogen and EIQ per euro of output. As
figures show, conventional farms use more inputs per
euro of output. Also, organic farms show lower levels
of nitrogen surplus per euro of output and, on the cont-
rary, higher EIQ levels than conventional farms.
With respect to these data, it has to be pointed out
that organic farming fertilisation is manure-based, as
opposed to conventional farming, in which chemical
synthesis fertilisers, easier to manage and apply, are
also allowed. This manure-based fertilisation is quite
a labour-intensive activity, which certainly affects its
demand. This, among other factors, makes the build-
up and surplus of nitrogen less likely to occur in orga-
nic farm soils and results in lower nitrogen surpluses.
On the other hand, the higher EIQ levels in organic
farms may be explained by the heavy reliance on
sulphur and copper-based products for the treatment
of vineyards. Due to the lengthy persistence on soils
of these products and the potential damage to some
beneficial insects, they are given high EIQ values9,
higher in some cases than EIQs of conventional pestici-
des. In fact, copper use has been restricted in the Euro-
pean Union and is not allowed in certain countries, its
total phase-out being foreseeable in the future. This
figure may seem counterintuitive at first, but it has to
be taken into account that the EIQ f ield use rating
depends highly on the rate of application, made up by
both the dose and the frequency of application. There-
fore, high rates of application of sulphur and copper-
based products in organic farms lead to high EIQ field
use ratings. On the other hand, low doses of other con-
ventional pesticides (prompted by usually higher prices),
that may get as high individual EIQs, lead to lower EIQ
field use ratings for conventional farms.
Shadow prices estimates
In this section, the results for the shadow prices of
nitrogen and pesticides, obtained for a model that treats
these environmentally detrimental variables as inputs
will be analysed. In this case, since desirable output is
total revenues or production value, the shadow price
indicates the revenue that has to be given up in order
to reduce pollution by one unit.
These results may be analysed from two points of
view. On the one hand, the use of the non-parametric
methods of efficiency measurement gives a measure
of the shadow price on the projection of each unit on
the frontier. Therefore, these shadow prices represent
the marginal rate of transformation between the good
output and the bad (treated as an input), regardless of
where the unit is projected on the frontier, which is
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the data set (average values, standard deviations between parentheses)
Land Labour Capital Fert/pest Output Nitrogen EIQ
(ha) (AWU)1 (€) (€) (€) (kg) (EIQ units)2
Whole sample 54.27 1.61 9,008 6,562 63,081 5,038 1,887
(49.5) (0.75) (6,791) (5,958) (46,749) (5,575) (829)
Conventional 58.25 1.52 9,246 6,218 53,351 5,084 1,490
(52.4) (0.55) (6,724) (5,574) (35,142) (5,076) (127)
Organic 47.54 1.76 8,606 7,141 79,501 4,960 2,557
(44.2) (1.00) (6,993) (6,607) (58,633) (6,416) (1,059)
1 AWU: annual work units. 2 EIQ: environmental impact quotient.
Table 2. Inputs per euro of output (average values)
Land/O Labour/O Capital/O F&P/O1
Whole sample 8.6 · 10–4 2.5 · 10–5 0.143 0.104
Conventional 1.1 · 10–3 2.8 · 10–5 0.173 0.116
Organic 6 · 10–4 2.2 · 10–5 0.108 0.09
1 F&P: fertiliser and pesticide expenses.
Table 3. Nitrogen and environmental impact quotient (EIQ)
per euro of output (average values)
Nit/Output EIQ/Output
Whole sample 0.080 0.030
Conventional 0.095 0.028
Organic 0.062 0.032
9 For a complete list of EIQ values and a detailed description of the methodology go to: http://www.nysipm.cornell.edu/ 
publications/eiq/
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determined by the orientation chosen in the model,
vector (yk, – bk), the own observation in this case.
On the other hand, the significance and implications
for the society of these shadow prices, i.e., the oppor-
tunity cost of pollution in terms of farm revenue may
be analysed. With this objective in mind, it is funda-
mentally the farms which really show an opportunity
cost when reducing pollution that we are interested in,
because it is precisely the per output emission levels
of these units which should be considered when trying
to set really restrictive environmental standards
In true, it is crucial to differentiate the units with a
positive opportunity cost of pollution reduction from
those whose cost is zero. The units showing a zero
opportunity cost are those that, having increased and
decreased good and bad output, respectively, according
to the distance function used in this work could subse-
quently increase eff iciency by reducing pollution.
Therefore, the social opportunity cost of a marginal
improvement in the environmental performance of
these units is null.
Generally speaking, all units with zero shadow price
are super-polluting units, but the opposite is not true.
This depends to a great extent on the directional vector
used. In this particular case, as mentioned above, we
considered it important that the direction of projection
of each unit towards the frontier were defined by its
actual combination of good and bad outputs.
Table 4 displays the average results for conventional
and organic samples. We present two averages for the
shadow price: that of the whole sample (including units
with null shadow price) and that of units with positive
shadow price (social opportunity cost) only, according
to the description above.
The large difference between these two average
measures of the shadow prices opportunity cost, though,
including units with opportunity cost zero and other-
wise, for the two contaminants and for the two agricul-
tures is important for the following reason: It indicates
that the implementation of an environmental policy
more restrictive than the current one would not repre-
sent a great sacrifice for society as a whole. For example,
if an environmental technical standard set a per output
emission level at the level of the marginal unit with
positive pollution shadow costs, this could be attained
with no sacrifice by society, provided that some «super-
polluting» units increased further their environmental
efficiency.
As opposed to considering a unique sample as the
subject of study, this analysis has been carried out
separately for the conventional and organic farm sub-
samples. Since the shadow price gives an indication of
the slope of the transformation curve, we ignore, in
case a unique sample is analysed, whether the shadow
price is reflecting the opportunity cost of pollution
reduction between the two regulations. And this, in
turn, does not allow measuring the restriction impo-
sed by each regulation independently, that is, the 
good output that has to be sacrificed in order to comply
with it.
Comparing the aggregated results for conventional
and organic farming, there are three points worth em-
phasising. First, the weight of units with zero or posi-
tive shadow price is much higher for nitrogen than pes-
ticides, both in conventional and organic farms. As
mentioned previously, this may reflect a more res-
trictive regulation for pesticides —through product
residues— than that of nitrogen. This has somehow
generated an intrinsic culture in the sector, reflected
by the observance of safety periods in pesticide appli-
cation, for instance.
Second, nitrogen shadow prices are substantially
higher in organic than in conventional farms, which
indicates that the marginal cost of nitrogen pollution
is higher, in terms of farm revenue, for organic than
for conventional farms. This implies that the efficient
frontier of organic regulation, on which organic farms
are projected, is steeper than the efficient frontier of
conventional farming. This indicates that organic regu-
lations are more restrictive concerning this aspect.
This result seems consistent with a view of the regu-
lation of organic farming as a regulation targeted at
the environmental quality of the inputs. In fact, pollu-
tion arising from organic fertilisation, i.e., from animal
manure application, is lower than that coming from
conventional fertilisation operations, i.e., from chemi-
cal synthesis products. Lower nitrogen surpluses of
organic farms in the sample give evidence of this.
Table 4. Average shadow prices (in euros). Standard devia-
tions between parentheses
Shadow price
All units Social cost
Nitrogen Pesticides Nitrogen Pesticides
Conventional 9.3 33.7 14 38.8
(10.8) (37.1) (10.5) (37.3)
Organic 82.3 48.9 188 58
(430) (38.3) (649) (34.7)
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However, fertilization cost is higher in organic agricul-
ture because animal manure application is quite a
labour-intensive activity, and this might reduce demand
of this fertilize in organic farms. The conjunction of
these two factors, and not only the environmental
quality of manure, might be the cause of the higher
shadow price of nitrogen of organic farms.
Likewise, the shadow price of pesticides is also higher
in organic than conventional farms. This result may
seem counterintuitive at first, especially if it is taken
into account the higher EIQ levels by organic farms,
as shown in Tables 1 and 3. However, it may be due to
the fact that organic farmers rely on cultural practices
more than conventional farmers do, as reflected by the
lower levels of fertiliser and pesticide expense per unit
of output. For instance, more non-chemical methods
of weed control are put in place, such as mechanical
manual cultivation, mulching and cover crops, to pre-
vent weeds from germinating and growing. Farm
management techniques for disease and pest infesta-
tion management, other than the resource to chemical
products, also contribute to explaining this higher sha-
dow price. In addition, organic prices and, therefore,
revenues, are higher, which implies more revenue
forgone for pesticide reduction.
These shadow prices also give us an idea about the
slope of the respective facets of the efficient frontiers.
It is evident that the slope nitrogen-desirable output is
much steeper in the case of organic farms, because the
shadow price is higher. For pesticides, the slope is
steeper too, although to a lesser degree, as reflected by
the shadow price values in Table 4.
Finally, there is quite a noticeable higher dispersion
on nitrogen pollution shadow price in organic farms,
as indicated by the standard deviation in Table 4. This
result may be due to the fact that the output-nitrogen
excess transformation curve has a great slope variation,
and also to the fact that the dispersion of nitrogen excess
per output is very high. The dispersion of nitrogen
excess per output is higher in organic than in conven-
tional farms, which may be explained by the lack of
standardisation on organic agriculture production
practices. This is in essence true as regards the utilisa-
tion of manure as fertiliser, since farmers do not possess
a priori knowledge on the nutrient richness of the ma-
nure they use10. However, this fact seems insufficient
to justify these differences in the dispersion of nitrogen
excess shadow price values11. Therefore, to our under-
standing, the higher dispersion on nitrogen excess
shadow price in the organic agriculture is due to: 1)
the great increase in marginal emission abatement
costs as these emissions decrease, and 2) the higher
dispersion in nitrogen excess levels per output unit in
organic farming.
To analyse more accurately the transformation curve
and the performance of the units in the two sectors,
Figures 2 and 3 present the shadow prices distribution
by ranges.
Regarding the shadow price of nitrogen, the diver-
gence between the percentage of conventional and
organic farms falling into the first range, less than €10
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Figure 2. Distribution of farms by nitrogen shadow price.
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Figure 3. Distribution of farms by pesticide shadow price.
10 In fact, a new program of education and research is being implemented in the region with the objective of teaching farmers
various simple procedures for approximating manure nutrient richness.
11 The variation coefficient of nitrogen excess per output is 0.74 for conventional farms and 1.27 for organic farms. The variation
coefficient of the shadow price varies between 1.16 (conventional farms) and 5.24 (organic farms).
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kg–1 of nitrogen excess, is quite noticeable, 38.9% 
of conventional farms and 15% of organic farms. In
the other range extreme, more than €30 kg–1 of ni-
trogen excess, only 2.8% of conventional farms are
found, as opposed to 33% of organic farms. Also, it is
shown that more than 60% of organic farms show a
shadow price value higher than €20 kg–1 of nitrogen.
In the case of conventional farms, this values goes
down to 36%.
With respect to the shadow price of pesticides, the
lower range extreme shows higher differences than in
the case of nitrogen: 27.6% compared to 11% of con-
ventional and organic farms, respectively, show shadow
prices lower that €10 EIQ–1. This divergence, though,
becomes rather similar in the other range extreme,
values higher that €100 EIQ–1, with 17% and 18.5%
of conventional and organic farms, respectively; 55.5%
of organic farms show a value higher than €20 EIQ–1,
but this value goes down to 30% in the case of conven-
tional farms.
Discussion
Some prudence is needed if one wants to compare
these results with other shadow prices shown in the
literature. In the f irst place, shadow prices are ex-
pressed in different units and the possibility of esta-
blishing meaningful comparisons is, therefore, limited.
For instance, the majority of literature references ex-
press the shadow price as euros per additional euro
spent on either nitrogen or pesticides, whereas we
express the shadow price as euros per additional kg of
nitrogen surplus or additional EIQ unit. In addition,
Färe et al. (2006) express the shadow price of nitrogen
leaching and runoff as index of crop revenue per index
of leaching.
In the second place, apart from this divergence on
what is measured and how it is expressed, there are also
differences regarding the methodologies employed,
that vary from the calculation of the shadow price
based on the dual values obtained from the restrictions
of a non-parametric DEA model (Piot-Lepetit and
Vermersch, 1998; Oude-Lansink and Silva, 2004) to
calculations based on the duality between the output
(input) distance function and the revenue (cost) function
by parametric estimations (Shaik et al., 2002; Färe et
al., 2006). Moreover, the differentiated treatment given
to the environmentally detrimental variables, which
can be treated as inputs or undesirable outputs and, also,
the consideration of the strong/weak disposability
hypothesis, contribute to a rather constrained compara-
bility of results.
Taking the above into account, the shadow price of
nitrogen pollution obtained in this application may be
comparable, to a certain extent, to that by Shaik et al.
(2002), in that both are expressed in terms of nitrogen
excess. Our values, though, are much higher, which
may be due to the fact that we deal with dry-farming
conditions in a Mediterranean context, which make
nitrogen built-up much lower.
Zhengfei et al. (2005) obtain much lower values
(expressed as additional euro spent on fertilisers and
pesticides) than ours. This may be again due to the
differences in climatic conditions and cultures, and the
fact that Dutch agriculture is highly intensive, compa-
red to this case. Another interesting feature of this
reference is that the shadow price of both fertilisers
and pesticides is higher in organic than in conventional
farms, a result also arising from this analysis. Dabbert
and Piorr (1998) obtain that nitrogen shadow prices
are up to 6 to 7 times higher in organic farming. This
amounts to up to 9-14 times in this case. Again, dry-
farming conditions may help to explain this divergence
in shadow price values.
Färe et al. (2006) express the shadow price and the
relationship between pollution costs and revenues, for
those units located on the frontier in US states agricul-
ture. The relationship between pollution costs and
revenues varies between 5 and 15%, which is conside-
red a coherent result with respect to other measures of
the cost of pollution in agriculture. If we measure the
relationship between nitrogen pollutions costs with
respect to output for the efficient units, these amount
to 20% and 10% for conventional and organic farms,
respectively. The pesticide pollution costs are higher
in both samples, organic and conventional. Again,
these results differ from those by Färe et al. (2006) but
they seem reasonable, given that, as mentioned above,
this is a dry-farming sample, where much less nitrogen
fertiliser and pesticides are used, and the opportunity
costs of its reduction are higher.
One important feature of the present empirical appli-
cation, as underlined above at various points in this
section, which perhaps contributes towards the better
understanding of the results is the fact that it has been
carried out for dry-farming conditions and a mild Me-
diterranean climate, according to Papadakis Agrocli-
matic classification (Gobierno de Navarra, 2001). This
implies that average nitrogen surpluses per farm and,
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therefore, per hectare are very low compared to those
arising from other conditions, such as irrigated agri-
culture and more humid climates (Oude-Lansink and
Carpentier, 2001; Oude-Lansink and Silva, 2004) or
dairy farming (Hadley, 1998). This, in turn, may
explain the high nitrogen shadow price values, mainly
for organic farms, whose nitrogen balances are even
lower. In addition, the total nitrogen surplus is used in
the calculation of the shadow price, which does not
allow establishing a further distinction among the
possible nitrogen pollution routes, such as leaching
and runoff, as done by Färe et al. (2006). Finally, re-
garding pesticides, the shadow price has been calcu-
lated for the potential environmental impact, as ex-
pressed by the EIQ. This gives an idea of how costly
may be impact reduction, and not pesticide expense
reduction.
As conclusion, in this article we try to give an answer
to the economic policy implications of a voluntary tech-
nical-environmental program, such as organic farming,
when looked at from the production side. These would
be the following:
First, is organic farming really environmentally res-
trictive? That is, does it imply a higher economic sacri-
fice? The comparison of shadow prices of organic and
conventional farms partly responds to this question.
The shadow price of nitrogen excess is higher for
organic than for conventional farms. This result is also
reflected by Dabbert and Piorr (1998), as cited by
Kratochvil (2002). Likewise, the shadow price of pesti-
cide impact is higher in the case of organic farms. These
results could indicate that, as expected, the amount of
revenue that needs to be given up in order to abate one
more unit of pollution in each farm, or how much
would farmers be willing to pay for increasing pollu-
tion by one unit, is higher for organic farmers. There-
fore, specific regulations on organic farming restrict
agricultural practices to a larger degree than current
restrictions affecting conventional farming.
Nevertheless, shadow price differences between or-
ganic and conventional farming are smaller for pesti-
cide than for nitrogen pollution. And this is not only
explained by the regulation.
Organic farming fertilisation is manure-based (slowly
transformed into soluble forms available to plants), as
opposed to conventional farming, in which chemical
synthesis fertilisers, easier to manage and apply, are
also allowed. However, when it comes to explaining
the difference between shadow values between the two
agricultures, the labour-intensive character of manure
use could be also a reason for the low emission levels
and high shadow price values. This intensity in labour
use might restrict manure use.
As regards to pesticide impact, the higher reliance
of organic farmers on cultural management practices,
such as mechanical cultivation, mulching and pruning,
that reduce the chance of disease (Rombough, 2002),
rather than the regular application of pesticides may
help to explain the higher shadow price. Nevertheless,
as mentioned before, shadow price differences are
smaller. This is due, in part, to similar pesticide appli-
cation systems. And also because an important culture
of pesticide use control exists in conventional farming,
engendered by existing regulations and by the notable
work of public technical extension and assistance ser-
vices in the region.
Second, there is a question related to the first one:
Is it necessary to subsidize organic farming? It could
be so, due to the higher shadow costs of pollution of
organic compared to conventional farms. This fact shows
the environmental superiority of organic standards and
could be also a justification to the agri-environmental
subsidies to organic farming
Third, could organic regulations be made more res-
trictive? Yes, because there are many farms with null
shadow prices. The great proportion of farms showing
null shadow price, both in conventional and organic
farming, shows that neither organic nor conventional
regulations are very environmentally restrictive. With
the distance function used in this work, the units with
null shadow price are those that, after having increased
eff iciency augmenting and reducing proportionally
production and pollution, could subsequently reduce
emissions for positioning themselves at the per output
emission level of the most polluting efficient unit. That
is, they may, in theory, reduce their emission levels in-
creasing their environmental efficiency. From the point
of view of the regulation, this means that it could be
feasible to restrict emissions to certain levels at a null
social cost, only by the increase in environmental effi-
ciency of specific farms.
Organic farming regulation is primarily targeted to
input environmental quality and it does not a priori de-
termine quantities of neither emissions nor polluting
inputs. Then, these results show that there is a lot of
room for introducing some restrictions on polluting
input quantities, not only qualities, without further
output sacrifice.
Four, is there any room for a technological-environ-
mental improvement of organic production farming?
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It seems so, since the very dispersion of organic shadow
prices gives an indication on that respect.
In fact, relating to the implementation of the organic
standard, a crucial aspect in the adoption of new tech-
nologies are the learning by doing and learning by using
processes. In agriculture, public services of technical
extension facilitate both the realisation of these pro-
cesses and the diffusion of new knowledge throughout
the sector. The great dispersion of organic shadow pri-
ces is very typical of new technologies, where produc-
tion processes are not standardised. In line with this,
it is also important to highlight the need of more re-
sources for research programmes targeted at the inves-
tigation of the different aspects of organic agriculture,
which is clearly scarce. Particularly, we identify as
crucial the research on the different products for plant
protection allowed in the EU organic regulations. In
principle, these products are more environmentally
friendly than products not allowed. But it might happen
that certain market conditions, prompting their use,
led to unintended consequences as regards the environ-
mental impact of these products. Scientific research
in the subject is, then, essential in order to clarify these
aspects and help both farmers and policy makers to
make decisions that contribute towards an improved
environmental quality, which may be considered, in
the last instance, the ultimate aim of organic farming.
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As mentioned earlier, in this work we choose to use
a non-parametric methodology, DEA. This method
allows us to articulate the expressions above and
calculate the directional distance for each unit by the
following linear programs, primal and dual for-
mulations in the left and right-hand side, respective-
ly; λ is a (N × 1) vector of intensity variables. We 
keep the same notation as [3] for inputs and outputs.
We have only distinguished the unit of analysis with
the lower index o in order to facilitate the presenta-
tion of the restrictions in the dual. As in equation [2],
pmo and qro are the shadow prices of good and bad
output of unit o, respectively; wno is the input shadow
value.
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